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                                      Abstract 
       This paper investigates quantitative importance of different savings motives on wealth distri-
    bution and aggregate capital accumulation by solving an overlapping generations model with het-
    erogeneity within generations. Agents differ in age, ability, earnings shocks and inherited bequests. 
    In the baseline economy there are uninsurable idiosyncratic risks associated with uncertain lifetime 
    and earnings shocks. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and solved numerically. Then we 
    compare the allocations of the baseline economy with those of an economy with complete annuity 
     markets, one without earnings uncertainty, and one without altruism. The numerical experiments 
    show that different savings motives seem to affect savings behaviors of various parts of the popu-
    lation in an unequal manner. The effect of completing annuity markets is dominantly on the old 
    population and results in a large increase inwealth and bequests inequality. Alternatively, taking 
    out earnings uncertainty decreases savings by the young and poor, but lowers wealth inequality for 
    the whole population. Finally, the disappearance of altruism affects mainly savings behaviors of
    the old and rich population, reducing wealth and bequests inequality. Regarding aggregate capital 
    and bequests, aside from the pure life-cycle motive, altruism isthe most important explaining fac-
    tor. Secondly inorder of importance, especially in explaining aggregate b quests, i  the absence of
     annuity markets hat generate precautionary savings among the retired population and accidental 
     bequests. The absence of insurance markets for earnings uncertainty, which generates precaution-
     ary savings among the working population, seems to be least important, inparticular, inexplaining 
    bequests accumulation. 
  *Ponce Ocampo: Goldman Sachs, London, UK; Phone E-mail Ignacio.Ponce-Ocampo@gs.com. Yuki: Faculty of 
Economics, Kyoto University, Yoshida-honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, 606-8501, Japan; Phone +81-75-753-3532; E-mail 
yuki@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official 
position ofGoldman Sachs. We would like to thank Mark Bils and Hugo Hopenhayn for their continuous advice. Useful 
comments arealso provided byPer Krusell. All errors are ours.
-1-
1 Introduction 
People save for many different reasons. Facing hump-shaped age-earnings profiles and no earnings after 
retirement, hey save in order to smooth consumption over time, which can be called the life-cycle 
motive of savings. They face uncertain earnings and incomplete insurance markets, so they accumulate 
wealth in order to self-insure against such uncertainty (the precautionary motive of savings). Further, 
they save in order to leave bequests to their children since they derive utility from such behavior (the 
altruistic motive of savings). Finally, uncertain lifetime and incompleteness of annuity markets leave 
some portion of wealth intended for consumption as bequests to children (accidental bequests)'. 
   Savings thus motivated etermine wealth accumulation over the life time, wealth distribution across 
heterogeneous people and aggregate capital accumulation. How important are the above mentioned 
savings motives for people with different ages and incomes, and bow do they influence the wealth 
distribution and the aggregate wealth? 
   The question is interesting and important by itself, but it is even more important because of the 
policy implications associated with it. Effects of policies that redistribute resources across people with 
different incomes, such as public transfer programs, estate taxation, unemployment i surance, public 
health insurance, or social security, are critically dependent on the relative importance of different 
savings motives. For example, if savings among young individuals are motivated by precautions 
rather than by life-cycle concerns, policies that deliver income insurance would decrease their savings. 
As a result, wealth inequality between young and old generations might increase and total capital 
accumulation might decrease. Alternatively, if the life-cycle motive is strong among them, they would 
still keep savings for the future, so wealth inequality and capital accumulation would be insensitive to 
these policies. 
  Many empirical studies based on available data tackled the question. These analyses tried to 
disentangle wealth for the purpose of intergenerational transfers from wealth generated by the life-cycle 
motive. They can be divided into two groups, those that follow an accounting approach and those that 
use a direct questionnaire approach. The accounting-based approach estimates the wealth accumulated 
  'Intergenerational transfers might be caused by different motivations. For example, Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) 
assumes that parents ransfer resources to children i return for old age support. This type of transfer motive isnot 
considered in the paper. 
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for intergenerational transfers as the accumulated net surplus of earnings over consumption. In this 
branch of literature there are papers by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Ando and Kennickell (1987), 
Kotlikoff (1988), and Modigliani (1988). The direct approach uses surveys asking people what share of 
their wealth is held for the purpose of intergenerational transfers. Exponents of this group are papers 
by Modigliani (1988) and Hurd and Mundaca (1989). 
   Although these stimates give valuable information, there are caveats associated with them. First, 
the estimates are sensitive to a variety of assumptions concerning the age of family formation, the 
age of retirement, and the age of death; the shape and stability over time of age-earnings and age-
consumption profiles, and of relative wages; and the definition of durable goods as consumption or 
investment (Blinder, 1988). Second, the estimates do not separate different savings motives in a 
fundamental sense. The calculation of life-cycle savings does not distinguish the precautionary motive 
from the pure life-cycle motive. The estimates of transferred wealth do not tell how much transfers 
increase by the presence of uncertain lifetime and the absence of some insurance markets2. 
   Most importantly, different savings motives interact, so it is very difficult to isolate each motive 
as the above empirical studies attempted' (Kessler and Masson, 1989). For example, consider an 
individual who received a certain amount of bequests from his parent. He can use this bequest to 
increase savings in order to finance his future consumption and/or to leave bequests for his child. This 
kind of savings is considered to be totally altruistically motivated by some researchers, but regarded 
as life-cycle savings by others, resulting in large discrepancies in the estimates even with the same 
data. The truth would be between the two extremes, but it cannot be known from the data. Taking 
another example, suppose that we want to know what fraction of bequests i  altruistically motivated 
and what fraction is accidental. We would compare inherited bequests with the amount of wealth that 
respondents of a questionnaire intended to leave to their families for altruistic reasons. The problem 
with this decomposition is that the deceased may get some utility from bequests that are not intended 
for altruistic reasons initially. 
   Finally, these estimates may supply some information -about he relative importance of different 
  2One mpirical work free from this feature is the one by Gale and Scholz (1994). Noticing the difficulty ofseparating 
accidental ransfers from total transfers, they directly estimated transfers excluding bequests, and found that such 
transfers account for at least 20 percent ofaggregate w alth (bequests account for additional 30 percent ofaggregate 
wealth). Their estimate suggests that he altruistically motivated savings is important even without uncertainty.
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savings motives for the current economy but not for the economy after some policies are changed. For 
instance, suppose that it is somehow found that individuals leave 60% of bequests for an altruistic 
reason and the rest is due to uninsured uncertain life-time (accidental bequests) in the current economy. 
Now suppose that the government increases estate taxation. Then people would try to reduce their 
bequests and increase their own consumption, because they obtain less utility from leaving a given 
amount of bequests. But wealth reserved for their own consumption may end up as accidental bequests 
since they do not know when they will die. As a result, a proportion of bequests left accidentally would 
increase. 
  Noticing the difficulties associated with the existing empirical studies, in order to tackle this 
question, we employ numerical simulations based on a realistic overlapping enerations model with 
heterogeneity within generations. There are some papers employing numerical simulations uch as 
Masson (1986), Laitner (1990), and Lord and Rangazas (1991). Our model is much more realistic 
in its structure and takes into account all the savings motives mentioned above. For this purpose, 
we compare the allocation of our baseline conomy with those of three different economies: one 
with a complete annuity market, one without labor earnings uncertainty and one without altruism. 
By following this approach we indirectly measure the effects of precautionary savings, altruistic and 
accidental bequests motives on individual savings behavior and aggregate wealth accumulation. As 
noted above, we followed this approach because it is infeasible to isolate the effect of each of these 
motives imultaneously in any model or data set due to the fact that all these motives are working in 
conjunction. 
   In the model, an individual is born to a parent with particular levels of assets and earnings. When a 
child, the individual does not have any choices and just inherits and acquires ability. Once he becomes 
an adult, he starts working, and then has a child. He receives earnings and capital income from his 
assets and allocates his income to current consumption and savings. The individual's earnings depend 
on his innate and acquired ability before he starts working, his age, and a stochastic omponent. 
Accumulated wealth comes from cumulative savings and inherited bequests. After a particular age, 
he retires and starts to face a probability of death, and once he dies he leaves his assets to his child as
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bequests. He derives utility from leaving bequests3. Inter vivos transfers are not modeled for technical 
difficulties. In the baseline conomy, insurance markets are non-existent and loan markets are not 
available (credit constraint). Hence savings are the only way to self-insure against he risks associated 
with uncertain lifetime and earning shocks. 
   The parameters of the baseline conomy are chosen so that the model matches the evolution of 
earnings across time and generations, and the distribution of earnings and wealth reasonably closely to 
those observed for the U.S. economy. The model succeeds not only in matching the overall distribution 
of earnings and wealth but also in reproducing distributions for subgroups of the population. 
   In addition to the literature on relative importance of different savings motives cited above, this 
paper is also related to the research on consumption and savings behaviors that use numerical methods 
to examine the issue, which includes Deaton (1991, 1992), Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1994, 1995), 
Gourinchas and Parker (2002), De Nardi (1999), Cagetti (2000), and Gokhale t.al (2001). This work 
is also somewhat related to the research that searches for models that can quantitatively reproduce 
the observed wealth distribution to a high degree, such as Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), Laitner 
(2000), and Castaneda,. Diaz-Gimenez, and Rios-Rull (2000). 
   The paper is organized as follows. The baseline model, which is supposed to reflect the actual 
U.S. economy, is described in Section 2 and the competitive equilibrium for this economy is defined 
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the hypothetical economies where complete insurance markets for 
uncertainties are available. Section 5 describes detailed procedures to calibrate the baseline model 
to the U.S. economy and Section 6 presents and explains results of numerical simulations. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
2 Economic Environment 
In this section, the baseline model that is calibrated to the U.S. economy in numerical examinations is 
presented. The underlying economic environment is a discrete-time overlapping generations world. In 
  ` That is, altruism is 'impure' as in the models by Yaari (1966) and Blinder (1973). Pure altruism, where the individual 
cares about the utility of his child (as in Barro, 1974 and Becker, 1974), isnot assumed in the paper. Pure altruism 
brings strategic interactions across generations in a realistic overlapping generations model as the one in the paper, and 
could lead to multiple competitive equilibria.
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this economy, an individual's life is divided into three parts, childhood, adulthood before retirement, 
and adulthood after retirement. 
   During his childhood he makes no economic decisions, o his age in the model is labeled only for 
his adulthood. In the model, 1 period is assumed to correspond to 5 years, and it is assumed that an 
individual lives up to 12 periods. This period setting is made for easing computational burdens. 
  An adult before retirement, who is between age 0 (age 25-29 in real life) and age 6 (age 55-
59 in real life), is called a young adult. A young adult receives income from work, assets holdings, 
bequests from his parent, if any, and a lump-sum transfer from the government, and makes decisions 
on consumption and assets holdings for the next period. He has a child at age 1 (age 30-34). His 
parent, who is 6 periods older than him, leaves him assets at death as bequests, because of a joy of 
giving and uncertain time of death. He supplies a fixed amount of time (normalized to 1) for work 
each period. Earnings depend on his innate and acquired ability before becoming an adult, his age 
(work experience), and a stochastic shock, which reflects all the stochastic hanges in earnings during 
the working period. During this period, the agent faces two types of risks, labor earnings uncertainty 
and uncertainty about his parent's living status. 
  When turning age 7 (age 60-64 in real ife), he retires and faces a probability of death for each year 
(including age 7) of his remaining life. An adult after retirement is called an old adult. He receives 
income from social security benefits and asset holdings, and makes decisions on consumption and asset 
holding for the next period. His social security receipt depends on the average arnings during his 
working period, which is a good approximation f the current U.S. social security system. After age 11 
(age 80-84 in real life) he dies for certain. Figure 1 presents the generational structure of the model. 
The following subsections describe the model in detail. 
2.1 Generational Structure 
As explained above, an individual's adult life starts at age 0 and may last up to age 11. Since age 7, 
that is after retirement, he faces a probability of death. His parent is 6 periods older than him, and. 
his child is 6 periods younger than him. In this setting only two generations coexist as living adults
-6-
a
                         Retirement Dies for certain 
    Generation t-6 + I I I + 
    (Parent) Age 6 7 8 9 10 11 
                            Retired Periods 
                       Child Born Retirement Dies for certain 
                                                                i.                                      r-~ 
   Generation t Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
                            Working Periods- Retired Periods 
Faced Earnings Living Status 
           Uncertainties Parental Living Status 
                                        Child Born 
    Generation t+6 
    (Child) Age 0 1 2 3 4 5 6                                           -+ Working Periods 
Figure 1: Generational Structure 
within a lineage, which simplifies the analysis4. The number of deaths and births in the economy is 
assumed to be the same each period so that the population of the economy is constant over time. The 
probability of surviving between age j and age j + 1 conditional on surviving up to age j is denoted 
by pj, with pj = 1, for j = 0, 1, 5 ; pj E (0,1) for j = 6, 7, • • ,10, and p11 = 0. 
2.2 Consumer's maximization problem 
An individual derives utility from the flow of his consumption when alive and from bequests ransferred 
to his child upon his death. Note that he cares about the bequests left to his child, but not about 
consumption of his child. That is, he has ` impure altruism'. As mentioned in the introduction, if
the individual is assumed to care about the consumption of his child, and both maximize utility as 
different economic units, strategic interactions across generations would arise in the model. This would 
increase the complexity of the analysis and therefore this simpler assumption ismade. Let cj and aj 
be his consumption and assets at age j. Denote his momentary utility function from consumption by 
U (•) and from bequests by F (•), respectively. Let the discount factor on future utilities be 3. Then 
his expected lifetime utility is given by the following expression: 
  41f the generational structure allows for the coexistence of three generations as adults, then different types of bequests 
(from agrandparent to agrandchild, or from a parent to a child and a grandparent) could arise and complicates he
analysis greatly without changing the model's implications much.
-7-
          6 11 
    EO[E/3 U(Cj) + EOj(III3k-=2OPk)JPj-1U(Cj) + (1 pj-1)F(aj)} + /311(lk Opk)F (a12)]• (1) 
          j=0 j=7 
   The expectation operator EO is attached to the above expression to indicate that as of period zero 
there are other types of risks (mentioned below) aside from the risk associated with the date of death. 
An individual survives until age j - 1 with probability IIk opk5. With probability pj-1, he survives 
the next period and obtains the utility from consumption ofgoods, cj. With probability 1 - pj_1i he 
dies before becoming age j and obtains utility from leaving bequests, aj. After age 11, he dies with 
certainty and obtains utility from bequests, a12. Future utility is discounted accordingly. 
   Assume that the functions U (•) and F (•) are strictly increasing and strictly concave. Further 
assume that limo U' (c) = oo and limb-,0 P (b) < K < oo, where K is a positive real number. The 
latter assumption is imposed in order to allow zero bequests for a portion of the population. 
  The individual chooses consumption and assets plans in order to maximize his expected utility 
subject o the following constraints: 
      (1 + -r,)cj + aj+l - (1 - ri)wlj + [1 + (1 - Tk)r]aj + tr, for j E {0,1, • .. 161, (2) 
                       if the parent did not die in this period, 
     (1 + T,)cj + aj+l - (1 - Tl)wlj + [1 + (1 - Tk)r](aj + bj) + tr, for j E {1, . 61, (3) 
                       if the parent died in this period, 
      (1 + T,)cj + aj+i = Socj + [1 + (1 - Tk)r]aj, for j E {7, 8, ... 111, (4) 
            and aj+1 > 0, for j E {0,1,••• ,11}, .(5) 
where aj+1 represents he asset holdings at age j + 1 and bj is bequests received at age j from his 
parent, if any. Further, r, w, and lj are the interest rate, the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, and 
his effective labor supply at age j, respectively. Finally, rc, ri, and Tk are tax rates on consumption, 
  5Since pj = 1 for j = 0, 1, 5 is satisfied, Hi- pk; is not attached to the first term of the above xpression.
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labor income and capital income, respectively, tr is a lump-sum transfer received during his working 
periods, and socj denotes -his social security receipt at age j. He faces a borrowing constraint each 
period so that he has to keep non-negative assets each period, which also implies that he cannot leave 
negative bequests to his child 6. 
   Since an individual may receive bequests upon his parent's death, he needs to form expectations 
of his future bequests receipt to solve the maximization problem. Assume that he has full access to 
the parent's information required to predict his future bequests, that is, the information needed to 
solve the parent's maximization problem after retirement (death can occur only after retirement). In 
order to simplify numerical computations, it is further assumed that the young individual solves his 
decision problem after observing his parent's current decisions. 
2.3 Earnings Process 
The agent's effective labor supply lj depends on his inherited and acquired ability before becoming an 
adult (earnings ability), his age (work experience), and a stochastic shock (earnings hock). Assume 
the following functional form for the effective labor supply, 
                             lj = 9ojqj, (6) 
where 9 is the earnings ability, cj is an age-dependent de erministic component, and ?7j is the earnings 
shock. 
  The earnings ability, 9, captures all the ability inherited or acquired before becoming an adult, 
which would depend on his innate ability, nurture, education, and family and environments he grew 
up in, although none of these dependencies are explicitly modeled. 9 is time-invariant throughout 
an individual's life, but it is correlated with his parent's earnings ability and follows the following 
stochastic process. 
                          logo = P log 9P -I- e, e ti N(0, U2), i.i.d, (7) 
  6There is a large literature on endogenous borrowing constraints
, but due to the computational complication, the 
simpler exogenous constraint is assumed.
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where 9 is the earnings ability of his parent and F is a stochastic shock to the process, which follows 
an i.i.d. normal distribution7. 
   The time-varying earnings hock, 77j, captures all the shocks to earnings after an individual starts 
working, which would include changes in his employment status, his job performance, health condition, 
the performance of the company he works for, etc. The shock is assumed to follow the following AR(1) 
process in logs, -
                      loge _ (logqj _1 + vj, vj ^ ' N(0, w), i.i.d (8) 
where qj_l is the earnings ability in the previous period (at age j - 1) and vj is a stochastic shock to 
the process, which follows an i.i.d. normal distribution. 
2.4 Recursive Formulation 
The above maximization problem is reformulated in a recursive way so that decision problems and 
state variables at every stage of life are stated clearly. This recursive formulation is used for solving 
the model numerically. 
2.4.1 Young adult's problem I (While his parent is alive) 
A young adult, who is between age 0 and age 5 and has a living parent, earns income through his 
job and assets, and may receive b quests next period ifhis parent dies. The agent has no uncertainty 
regarding his own life span. So, his dynamic programming problem atage j (0 < j < 5) reads as 
follows, 
           Vi (9,r,,1,a,s1';S) = max {U(c)+ (9) 
                                                       c, a/ 
           3E[pj+6V7+l (e, , L', a', Sr'; S') + (1 - pj 46)Vj+1 (a, a', s1'/; s'
  7Since decisions on human capital investment are not explicitly modeled
, the above process captures all the sources of 
the intergenerational correlation of earnings including genetic transmission of ability and effects of incomplete markets 
on human capital investment.
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subject to (1 + T,)c + a = (1 - Ti)wl + [1 + (1 - Tk)r]a + tr, 
   l= 0O77) 
= {9q(j+1)rj +j.l}/( +1), 
      log rl' = ( log rl + v', v' - N(0, av), i.i.d, 
      a > 0, 
        sp' = T (SP), 








  In equation (9), Vi (0,,q,7, a, sP; S) is his expected discounted welfare atage j; 
  Vj+1 (0, rl', l', a') SP/; S') and Vj+1 (B, rl', l', a', SP'; S') are the next period's welfare wh n hisparent 
is still alive and when his parent dies, respectively; a is a discount factor on future utilities; Pj+6 is 
the current conditional probability of his parent (of age j + 6) surviving the next period; and E is the 
expectation operator conditional on the information available in the current period. In the budget 
constraint (10), c is consumption, 1 is effective labor supply, a is assets (variables with superscript '/' 
denote variables for the next period). The wage rate per effective labor supply is denoted by w and 
the interest rate is denoted by r. Tax rates on consumption, labor income and capital income are 
expressed by r,, ri and Tk, respectively. tr is a lump-sum transfer from the government. The effective 
labor supply 1 is dependent on the time-invariant earnings ability, 9, the age-dependent deterministic 
component q(j), and the stochastic omponent q, which follows an AR(1) process in logs (equation 
11 and 13). The average ffective labor supply up to this period l is a component of his state vector 
because the future social security benefit is dependent -on it. A vector of state variables for his parent 
(sp) is needed to predict his bequests receipt (the exact component of the vector is explained below) 
and the transition function for this vector is denoted T(.) (equation 15). The aggregate state of 
the world is represented by a vector S and W (.) characterizes the evolution of the aggregate state 
(equation 16).
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2.4.2 Young adult's problem II (After his parent dies) 
In the period his parent dies, the young adult at age j (1 < j 
following problem: 
           V~ (0,,q,1, a, sP; S) = max{U (c) +,C3E[Wj+1 
                                                          c, a/ 
subject to
< 5) receives bequests and solves the
(e,rl,l,a;S)}}, (17)
               (1 +'rC)c + a' Tl)wl + [1 + (1 -- rk)r] (a + b) + tr, (18) 
and equations (11), (12), (13), (14) and (16). 
  In the above formulation, Wi+1 (9,17', l', a';S') is his welfare in th  next period and bis the bequest 
received from his parent, which is dependent on his parent's tate sp. Since the young adult is assumed 
to have enough information to know his parent's tates after retirement, b coincides with the parent's 
optimal asset plan at age j + 6 (determined at age j + 5) when the parental state is sP. Note that the 
function Wi+ldoes not depend on sP since he has already received bequests. 
  From the next period on, the young adult solves the following problem: 
            Wi (9,17,1, a; S) max{U (c) +,~3E[W'+1 (9, rj a'; S')]}, (19) 
                                                      c,a~ 
subject o equations (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (16). 
2.4.3 Maximization Problem at age 6 
In the next period (at age 7), he becomes a retiree, starts receiving a social security payment and 
faces a positive probability of death. By this age his parent is dead with certainty (See Figure 1), and 
now he has to care about the event of his child inheriting his assets. 
  If his parent is dead before the previous period, he solves the following problem: 
          Ws (0,,q, 1, a; S) = maax{U (c) + /[p6J7 (1, a'; S') + (1 - p6)F (a')]}, (20)
-12-
r
subject to equations (10), (11), (14) and (16), where Ps is the agent's current conditional probability 
of surviving the next period, j7 (, a/ ;S') is the welfare atage 7 if he is still alive, and F (a') is the 
utility associated with leaving bequests if he dies. Note that function j7 does not depend on 0 and rl 
anymore because he retires after this period. 
  If his parent was alive in the previous period, he solves the problem below. 
        V6 (0,71,7, a, sP; S) = max{U (c) + ,3[P6J7 (1, a'; S') + (1 - p6) F (a')]}, (21) 
                                                  c, a' 
subject to equations (18), (11), (14), and (16). 
2.4.4 Old Adult's Problem 
After etirement, the individual receives social security benefits, and faces apositive probability of 
death. An old adult at age j (7 < j < 11) solves the following problem. 
           J3 (7, a; S) = max{U (c) + j3[pjJJ+l ( , a'; S') + (1 - pj)F (a )]}, (22) 
                                      c, a 
subject to 
                    (1+ T,)c + a' = soc(l) + [1 + (1 - rk)r]a, (23) 
  (14) and (16). 
  In the above formulation, J. +1 (l, a'; S') is the welfare inthe next period ifhe is still alive, F (a') is 
the utility from leaving bequests if he dies, and soc(l) denotes his social security receipt, which depends 
on his average earnings during his working life 1. Note that he individual dies before becoming a e 
12 with probability 1, so that pil = 0. 
   From the formulation of the maximization problem, it is now clear that he vector of parental state 
variables needed for a child to predict bequests is P = (jP, ZP, ar'), where jP is age, F is lifetime average 
effective labor supply, and aV is the next period's assets of his parent, respectively. The variable aP' 
is the current state variable because a child makes decisions after observing his parent's decisions by 
assumption.
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2.5 Final Goods Production 
The firm hires capital and labor and solves the profit maximization problem, 
                       max{O(k,1)-wl-(r+S)k}, (24) 
where 0 (.) denotes the CRS final goods production function, k and 1 denote aggregate capital and 
efficiency labor, respectively, and 5 is the depreciation rate of physical capital. The first-order condi-
tions associated with the firm's problem provide the real interest rate and wage rate as functions of 
the capital-efficiency labor ratio. 
2.6 Governmental Policies 
The government taxes labor income, capital income and consumption tofinance the hump-sum transfer, 
social security and other policies. The policies other than the transfer policies are consumption of 
final goods by the government and are assumed not to affect an individual's utility. The government's 
budget constraint reads, 
                            tr + soc + c9 = r1u)l + -rkrk + rr,c, (25) 
i where tr is the total lump-sum transfer, soc is the total social security payment, and cg is the spending 
on other policies. 
3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium 
The analyses in later sections focus on a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium where decision 
problems are recursive, and the aggregate state of the world and governmental policies are time-
invariant. The followings are the formal definitions of a recursive competitive equilibrium and of a 
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium. 
Definition 1 A Recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the economy consists of.• 
  (i) the value functions
-14-
4
    {Vj (9, 77, 1a)sp; S) } j_0, {Vi (0, 77, 1a, sp; S) }6_1, {Wi (0, 77, 1, a; S) }j-2, and {J~ (l, a; S) }j17; 
    (ii) the decision rules 
      a) for a young adult with aliving parent, {AV(6, (0,,q,1, a, sp;S), Cv(0, 77, 1a, sp; S)}~-0; 
      b) for a young adult who has just lost his parent, {AV,(0,7j,1, a, s2';S), CV(0,77,1, a, s"; S)}~=1i 
      c) for a young adult whose parent is dead, {AW(0, 77, 1a; S), Cy(0, 77) ,a; S)};-2; 
     d) for an old adult, {A j(1, a; S), C j(1, a; S)},17; 
    (iii) the price functions W and R; 
     (iv) the governmental policies -rl, Tk, Tc, tr, soc(k) and cg; 
     (v) the law of motion for the parent's tate of the world s' = (jr', lp, ap'), T; 
     and 
    (vi) the law of motion for the aggregate state of the world S - SV x Sv x SW x Sj, I, where Sv is the 
 joint distribution of j, 0,,q,1, a, and sp for young adults with alive parents, SV is the joint distribution of the 
 same variables for young adults who have just lost their parents, SW is the joint distribution of j, 0, 77,7, and a 
 for young adults whose parents are dead, and Sj is the joint distribution of j, 1, and a for old adults ;
    such that, 
    1. An age j (0 < j < 5) young adult with a living parent solves problem (9), with the maximized value 
 function given by Viand the decision rules by AV and CV. 
    2. An age j (1 < j < 6) young adult who have just lost his parent solves problem (17), with the maximized 
 value function given by V3 and the decision rules by AV and CV (When he is age 6, he solves problem 21). 
    3. An age j (2 < j < 6) young adult whose parent is dead solves problem (19), with the maximized value 
 function given by Wi and the decision rules by Aye, and Cy-' (When he is age 6, he solves problem 20). 
    4. An age j (7 < j < 11) old adult solves problem (22), with the maximized value function given by Ji and 
  the decision rules by Aij and C.-Ii 
     5. The law of motion for the parent's state of the world s'' = (jP, li', ap'), T is composed of the following set
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of equations: 
                                   jP' = jP + 1, (26) 
                              aP' = A' 6 (aP, lP; S) , (27) 
                                     and 1P' = lP. (28) 
A young adult's prediction of the future bequests i  consistent with the actual bequests received from his parent 
when state sP is realized. 
   6. The firm solves problem (24), with the first-order conditions given by R = 01 (k, 1) - 6 and W = 02 (k, 1), 
where k and 1 are given b y
                                           11                       k=E I a•dS (29) 
                                                 j=0 
6                   and1= f B0(j),q • d (Sv xSV xSW) . (30) 
                                         j=0 
   7. The government's budget constraint is satisfied, i.e. 
              tr +soc + cg = -r,c + rlwl + -rkrk, (31) 
                                  11             where soc= f q(l) • dSa (32) 
                                     j=7                  6[f f f and c = J CV() dSv+J CV()•dSV+J Cw()•dSW 
                                   j=0 
                                   11 r 
                      +~ J C'~(•) • dSi . (33) 
                                       j=7 
   and 
  8. The law of motion of the aggregate state of the world, S, is consistent with individual decisions, the firm's 
choices and governmental policies, and evolves according to 
                              S'='(S). 
                                                 -16-
i
Definition 2 A stationary recursive competitive quilibrium is a recursive competitive equilibrium in 
which S = ' (S) and the governmental policies are time-invariant. 
4 Completing Markets 
In the baseline conomy described above, an individual self-insures against earnings uncertainty and 
lifetime uncertainty by accumulating wealth for a precautionary eason. When there are markets 
to insure against hese risks, precautionary savings and accidental bequests disappear. In order to 
measure changes in the distribution of wealth and aggregate capital accumulation i the presence of 
such insurance markets, two hypothetical economies, the one with complete annuity markets, and the 
one without earnings uncertainty, are constructed in this section. 
4.1 Economy with Complete Annuity Markets 
Suppose that there is a complete annuity market so that an individual can insure against his uncertain 
time of death. Let 1+' units of consumption ofthe next period be the gross return of one unit of the                        Pj-1 
annuity security if the individual survives and nothing otherwise8.. Let X denote the fraction of assets 
that is annuitized. Therefore, at any point in time, if he were to die, the non-annuitized portion of his 
assets, (1 - X) a', will be bequeathed to his child, while the annuitized portion, Xa', will go to finance 
insurance claims of survivors. 
  Then the budget constraints of an individual over age 6 become 
         (1 + T,)c + (1 - X')a + X'a' = (1 - Tl)wl + [1 + (1 - 'rk)r]a + tr, for j = 6 (34)
(1 + T,)c + (1 - X')a + X'a = soc(d) + [1 + (1 - Tk)r](1 - X) a+ 
             (1 -Tk)(1 +r -11 + Pi-1 Pj-1)
  8In this way the relative price of this security in terms of consumption is 1. 
to set up this market where the relative price is not one.
    Xa, for j = 7, ... , 10, (35) 
Clearly there are other equivalent ways
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    and 
  (1+-rc)c+a' =soc(l)+ [1+(1 -Tk)r)(1 -x)a+ 
         ~> [l+(1Tk)(1+r_P1O)]Xa, - P 
                                                  lo Xa, for j 11. (36) 
   Note that x' is an additional decision variable for those who are between age 6 and age 10 and x 
is an additional state variable for those above age 7. The return of the annuity is higher than normal 
assets due to pj_1 < 1. Hence, in the absence of altruism, the individual will hold all of his assets in 
an annuitized form, so that V = 1. 
4.2 Economy with no earnings uncertainty 
In addition to annuity markets being incomplete, the baseline model has also assumed the absence 
of markets in which consumers can purchase insurance against earnings uncertainty. In order to set 
up complete insurance markets for the earnings uncertainty, one could introduce contingent claims 
just as above. However, due to computational difficulties we take a shortcut by considering the model 
economy where the earnings hock 77 always takes a common value. The constant value of q is set so 
that aggregate efficiency labor of this economy is at the same level as in the original economy9. 
5 Calibration 
In this section, the model's functional forms are specified and the parameter values are set for numerical 
simulations. The parameters are set based on existing empirical works, if available. Otherwise, they 
are set so that the simulated economy produces tatistics that resemble those of the. U.S. economy 
when policy parameters in the model are set based on actual policies. 
5.1 Final goods production and Preferences 
Final goods production function: The function is assumed to be of the standard Cobb-Douglas type: 
  ` )Recall that he complete markets economy will.not be Pareto ptimum due to distortionary taxation and the existence 
of the borrowing constraint. Therefore, solving the planner's problem will not deliver the market allocation.
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t
                          0 (k, 1) = k9' (37) 
  The parameter a is set to 0.36, following most works in quantitative macroeconomics.-
  Depreciation rate for physical capital S: The annual rate of depreciation is usually set between 
0.08 and 0.10 in the quantitative business cycle literature. Choosing the midpoint of these estimates 
and noting that each period in the model corresponds to5 years in real life, the depreciation rate for 
numerical simulations i set to be 1 - (0.91)5. 
  Utility functions: The utility function for consumption of final goods is assumed to be of the 
CRRA variety: 
                                              cl-Q _ 1 
  The utility function for bequests i given by 
                                                   b' i-~                       F(b') =b1 1+ b
2 , a > 1. (39) 
The presence of, 1 in the above expression permits some individuals to leave no bequests. 
   These preference parameters a, bl and b2, and the discount factor on future utilities /3 are set so 
that the simulated model economy delivers a good overall match of the U.S. wealth distribution. The 
parameter values chosen for simulations are presented in the next section when simulation results of 
the baseline model are discussed. 
5.2 Earnings Process 
Remember that the effective labor supply 1 of an individual of age j is given by the following function,
                  l = 0O(j) )77, 
where 6 is the earnings ability (time-invariant), 0(j) is th 
the time-variant s ochastic omponent (earnings shock).
e deterministic component at 
The earnings shock 71 follows
     (40) 
age j, and 71 is
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                      log i'= (log j + v', v'- N(0, w), i.i.d. (41) 
The earnings ability 9 is correlated across generations in the following manner, 
                       log 8= p log O + F, F - N(0, o f ), i.i.d., (42) 
where 9 , is the earnings ability of his parent. 
  The age-dependent deterministic component 0(j) is specified based on the empirical estimates by 
French (1999). He uses the PSID and the PSID validation study for the years 1978-1987 to estimate 
the stochastic process of labor earnings. His estimate of the deterministic component is: 
         q5(j)=0.18+jx0.099-j2x0.0015+j3x0.85x10-5- j4x0.11x10-7. (43) 
  The AR processes for the innate ability and for the earnings ability are discretized based on the 
Tauchen (1986)'s procedure. The parameters p, a2 , ( and o f are difficult to set based on the existing 
empirical work and they are pinned own so that the simulated model produces earnings distribution 
and intergenerational correlations ofearnings close enough to the corresponding statistics of the U.S. 
economy. The chosen parameter values are presented in the next section. 
5.3 Survival Probabilities 
The survival probabilities are taken from the 1985 Vital Statistics of the Life Tables for Health Statis-
tics (1999) of the U.S. population. Since in the model an individual lives until turning age 7 (age 
60-64 in real life) with certainty and dies with probability 1 after age 11 (age 80-84 in real life), the 
conditional survival probabilities are adjusted accordingly. 
5.4 Governmental Policies 
Recall that the government collects its revenue by levying taxes on labor income, capital income and 
consumption. The tax revenues are then used to finance lump-sum transfer, social security system
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iand other policies. The non-transfer policies are consumption of final goods by the government 
are assumed not to affect the individuals' utility. The government's budget constraint reads,
and
                           tr + soc + c9 = -rCc + Tiwl +'rkrk, (44) 
where tr is the total lump-sum transfer, soc is the total social security payment, c9 is the spending 
on other policies, and -r,, 7rl, and "rk are tax rates on consumption, labor income and capital income. 
   Social Security System: The social security payment is based on the average life-time labor earn-
ings 1. Therefore, agents with different earnings histories receive different amounts of social security 
benefits. Assume that the social security benefit of an individual at age j is determined by the following 
function, 
                               socj(l) =,;w 1. (45) 
The parameters is set to be 0.4. Then a retired worker gets 40% of the average of his lifetime 
labor earnings, which is close to the value (42%) people with average arnings would receive in the 
U.S. economy, according to the information of the Social Security Administration. However, the 
actual social security system is progressive, so that people with higher earnings receive less than 
proportionally. In order to take into account this feature of the actual system, the computed average 
lifetime arnings 7is adjusted accordinglylo 
   Tax rates: The tax rates on labor income rl, capital income rk, and consumption rc are set to 
be equal to 0.2887, 0.398, and 0;0523, respectively, following Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), who 
computed effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption using national accounts and revenue 
statistics. The values are averages of their estimates for years 1980-1999. 
   Lump-sum transfer: The value of the lump-sum transfer to the working population tr is chosen 
so that the ratio of the transfer to GDP in the baseline conomy becomes 0.031, which is the average 
 10In particular, 1 is adjusted so that workers inparticular positions ofthe earnings distribution receive the same 
proportions of their average lifetime earnings a they would when they retire before age 62 in the U.S. economy. The 
targeted workers are those who receive earnings at the national verage level, 45% of the average earnings, and 160% of 
the average earnings steadily throughout their lives. These particular workers are chosen since their benefits examples 
are found in a document of he social security administration. Thereferred U.S. replacement ratios are the averages of 
the ratios for years 1990-99.
-21-
Table 1: Earnings Parameters [Baseline]
C v P E
0.4 0.392 0.7 0.303
of the ratios in the U.S. economy for years 1980-1999. The U.S. transfers used to compute the ratios 
are sums of all the non-educational governmental transfers excluding social security, Medicare, and 
retirement benefits.
6 Results 
6.1 Baseline Model 
In this subsection, the calibration procedures for the remaining parameters of the earnings process 
and preferences are explained and the chosen parameter values are presented. Then the results of the 
simulated baseline economy are presented and compared with the data of the U.S. economy.
6.1.1 Earnings Distribution 
The parameters of the earnings process are chosen so that the distribution of earnings and the evo-
lution of earnings across time and generations are reasonably close to those observed for the U.S. 
economy. In particular, attention is paid to the following statistics: (i) the 'static' earnings distri-
bution; Gini coefficient, proportion of the population without earnings, shares of earnings held by 
particular percentiles, ratio of earnings of the highest 1% to the lowest 40% of the distribution 11, 
and mean to median ratio; (ii) its transition over time and over generations; 5 year correlation of log 
earnings for an individual 12, and intergenerational correlation of log of life-time arnings; and (iii) the 
distributions for the skilled and unskilled labor; Gini for college and non-college graduates13, earnings 
ratio of college to non-college graduates. Table 1 presents the chosen parameter values. 
  Table 2 presents the statistics of the earnings distribution of the baseline conomy and of the U.S. 
 "This is the ratio of average earnings that an individual in the highest 1% of the earnings distribution receives to
average earnings that an individual in the lowest 40% receives. 
  12Remember that 1 period in the model corresponds to 5 years. 
 13 Actually, Gini for people without college education is ot available in the data. However, Gini for those with high 
school education a d Gini for those without high school education are available, the numbers being 0.554 and 0.733, 
respectively.
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economy. The statistics of the static U.S. earnings distribution are from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini 
and Rios-Rull (1997), who used the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 1992 as the data source. 
The proportion of population without earnings is computed as the sum of the proportions with zero 
earnings and with negative arnings in the data, which are 24% and 0.42%, respectively. The range of 
the values of the intergenerational correlation of lifetime earnings i based on Mulligan (1997), Solon 
(1992) and Zimmerman (1992). College graduates in the model are defined as those who are in the 
top 27% of the distribution of the earnings ability 9. This value is the observed percentage ofcollege 
graduates in the data used in Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997). 
                      Table 2: Earnings Distribution [Baseline]
Statistics for Earnings Distribution Baseline I U.S. economy
Gini coefficient 0.6319 0.628 i
Proportion of population w/o earnings 30.45% 24.42% i
Share of earnings held by top 1 % 10.26% 14.76% i
Top 5% 29.19% 31.13%
Top 10% 43.34% 43.51% i
Top 20% 63.2% 61.39% i
Top 40% 85.38% 84.72% i
Top 60% 97.19% 97.21% i
Ratio of highestl% to lowest 40% 146 211 i
Mean/Median 1.768 1.65 i
5 year correlation of log earnings 0.7203 (n/a) i
Intergenerational correlation of log-lifetime earnings _ 0.4484 0.32-0.54
Gini for college graduates 0.5934 0.564 i
Gini for non-college graduates 0.5763 (n/a)
Earnings.ratio of college to non-college 2.713 2.715
  It should be stressed that with these few parameters the overall shape, the shape for each education 
group and transitions of the earnings distribution are matched satisfactorily. The match is not so 
successful for the extreme upper. tail of the distribution and the proportion of the population with 
zero earnings. In the model the upper tail has lower concentration than in the data, and the proportion 
of the population with no earnings i higher than observed. In the model, everyone r tires when turning 
age 7 (age 60-64 in real life), but many retire at older ages in the actual economy, which would be the 
reason for this higher proportion.14.. Since the U.S. statistic for the 5 year correlation of log earnings 
is not available, in a later section, the sensitivity of results is checked by performing experiments with 
 14Another possible r ason for the discrepancy would be that he basic economic unit in the data is a household that 
includes a person or a couple who live together and all other financially dependent individuals who live in the same 
household. As a result, here are cases where the head of the household is retired but other individuals in the same 
household are still in the labor force.
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different values for the correlation coefficient of the earnings hock process, (. 
6.1.2 Wealth Distribution 
The preference parameters /3, a, b1 and b2 are of fundamental importance in determining the shape 
of the simulated wealth (assets) distribution. They are set so that the simulated economy matches 
the U.S. wealth distribution in: (i) its overall distribution} Gini, proportion of people without wealth, 
shares of wealth held by particular percentiles, mean to median ratio, and ratio of wealth of the 
highest 1% to the lowest 40% of the distribution; (ii) its distribution within the working population 
and the retired population; Gini and proportion of people without assets for each group; and (iii) the 
distributions among college and non-college graduates; Gini for each group. Table 3 shows the chosen 
parameter values15 
                            Table 3: Preference Parameters
I'
0 bl b2
(0.96)54.0 -0 .175 19.0
Table 4: Wealth Distribution [Baseline]
Statistics for Wealth Distribution Baseline U.S. economy
Gini for the whole population 0.7810 1 0.7810
Proportion of population without wealth 20.71% I 6.9%
Share of wealth held by top 1% 24.17% I 29.55%
Top 5% 49.78% I 53.50%
Top 10% 64.34% I 66.12%
Top 20% 80.22% I 79.49%
Top 40% 94.47% I 92.92%
Top 60% 99.2% I 98.64%
Mean/Median 4.134 1 3.61
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 1207 ( 875 II
Gini for working population 0.7992 (n/a)
Proportion of working population w/o wealth 24.83% (n/a)
Gini for retired population 0.7383 I 0.7250
Proportion of retired population w/o wealth 11.3% I (n/a) I~
Gini for college graduates 0.7356 I 0.7640 II
Gini for non-college graduates 0.7411 0.734/0.752 II
  Table 4 presents the statistics of the wealth distribution. The statistics for the U.S. wealth distri-
 15The presented Gini for retirees in the U.S economy is the Gini for individuals aged above 65. The Gini for those 
aged between 61 and 65 is 0.744. The corresponding U.S. statistic for the Gini for non-college graduates is the Gini for 
high school graduates (0.734) and the Gini for those without high school education (0.752).
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                      Table 5: Bequests Distribution [Baseline] 
                          Statistics for Bequests Distribution Baseline 
                                    Gini 0.8289 
                         Proportion of populatio without bequests 37.11% 
bution are from Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997)16 
  The simulated economy delivers a tight match to the U.S. wealth distribution. In particular, the 
Gini coefficient for the whole population, the shares of wealth held by top 10, 20, and 40% of the 
distribution, and the Gini for non-college graduates are almost identical to the corresponding values 
of the. U.S. data. On the other hand, the proportion of the whole population without wealth is much 
less and the share of wealth held by top 1 is lower than the corresponding U.S. statistics. Although 
the proportion of the population without wealth of the calibrated model ooks far from the reality, 
it is actually not, since about 24% of the population in the U.S. data hold wealth that is virtually 
indistinguishable from zero17. The higher proportion of non-wealth population might be caused by 
the higher population without earnings in the model, as noted above. Another factor causing this gap 
may be the fact that the model does not consider inter-vivos transfers, and as a result, the working 
population may hold less wealth than actually observed. 
  Figure 2 displays the age-wealth profiles for people who are in the top 20%, middle 40%, and 
bottom 40% of the earnings ability (9) distribution18. They can be considered as the profiles of 
different education groups. 
   When individuals are very young, they hold only small amounts of assets. However, over time they 
steadily increase wealth oldings partly because more of them receive bequests from their parents. This 
can been seen clearly from Figure 3, which plots age against average inherited bequests19. The bequests 
receipts increase with age until age 3 (age 40-44 in real life), then slightly decrease. Comparing the 
graphs for wealth and bequests, it is clear that, before age 3, wealth is accumulated mainly through 
  16 The presented U.S. statistic for the proportion f the population without wealth isthe sum of the proportions of 
individuals with zero wealth (3.4%) and of those with negative wealth (3.5%). 
  17 To be more accurate, in the histogram of the wealth distribution presented in Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull 
(1997), about 24% of the sample belongs to the same interval s individuals without wealth.   18The wealth level for each age is computed in three steps. First, for a given age we divide agents into three different 
groups by earnings ability, then we construct average w alth oldings for each group, and finally we take an average of 
these holdings atthe beginning and the end of the period.   ")The averages are taken for all individuals in a cohort including those whose parents do not die at that age.
i i 289
portion  ulation ithout uests . 1% 1I
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bequests receipts. Far from the retirement age and expecting future earnings to increase, they do not 
have any motives to save except for precautionary easons'. Around age 3 (age 40-44) they start 
accumulating more wealth for retirement, and at age 6 or 7 (age 55-59 or age 60-64), depending on 
their earnings abilities, the asset holdings are at the peaks, which is consistent with the data21. After 
retirement, hey start dissipating assets for consumption. People with the low earnings ability dissipate 
most of their assets by age 11, which indicates that most of bequests are left by those with the high 
earnings ability. This is reflected in Table 5 for the bequests distribution, where the Gini coefficient 
and the percentage of the population without leaving bequests are higher than the corresponding 
values for wealth of retirees.
a
6.1.3 Consumption Distribution
Table 6: Consumption Distribution[Baseline]
II Statistics for Consumption Distr. Baseline
0.4003 iGini
Variance of log consumption 0.4643 i
Gini for working population 0.3989 i
Gini for retired population 0.3994
  Table 6 shows the statistics for the consumption distribution. The consumption i equality is 
much lower than the earnings and wealth inequalities. The variance of log consumption for the whole 
population is equal to 0.4643, which is close to the U.S. values (between 0.4 and 0.47) reported in 
Deaton and Paxon (1994), who used the 1980-1990 versions of the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX). 
  Figure 4 displays the age-consumption profiles. The profiles reproduce the empirically observed 
humped shape. When individuals are very young, their profiles are quite steep, but gradually become 
flatter. The peaks of their consumption levels are at age 4 (age 45-49 in real life) or age 5 (age 
50-54) depending on the earnings abilities, which are earlier than the peaks of wealth accumulation. 
This matches the U.S. value (around age 50-55) reported in Caggetti (2000), who used the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX), years 1980-1995. After the peaks, consumption levels steadily decrease 
 20They would want to borrow if there were no borrowing constraints. 
 21 According to the data used in Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull (1997), the average wealth held by a household 




6.1.4 Aggregate variables 
Finally, Table 7 shows the statistics of the aggregate variables and the prices. The U.S. ratio of the 
government revenues to GDP is computed from Table 1.1 and 3.1 of National Income and Product 
Accounts Tables by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (2001)22, and 
the U.S. ratio of Social Security expenditures to GDP is taken from Appendix F of The Budget and 
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2002-2011 by Congressional Budget Office23. 
                  Table 7: Aggregate Variables and Prices [Baseline]
Statistics for Aggregates I Baseline I U.S. Economy 11
Soc. Sec./GDP 1 9.34% 1 7.5%
Gov. Rev./GDP 1 27.82% 1 27.98%




Yearly interest rate 4.95%
After-tax yearly interest rate 2.98%
  The aggregate variables and the prices get close to the data in like manner. The higher ratio of 
social security benefits to GDP may be explained by the higher proportion of retired people in the 
model economy. 
6.2 Complete Annuity Market 
Now the statistics of the baseline economy are compared with the hypothetical economies to see how 
market incompleteness and -altruism affect the distribution of wealth and consumption, and overall 
capital accumulation. In this subsection, comparison is made with the economy in which annuity 
markets are completed. 
  Table 8 shows the statistics for the wealth distribution of this economy in comparison to those for 
the baseline economy. The Gini coefficients for the whole population, for each age group, and for each 
 22 The number is the average of the current government revenues as percentage of GDP for the years 1980 - 1999. 
 23 The number is the sum of Social Security; Medicare and other federal retirement and disability programs' expenses 
as a percentage of GDP for the years 1980-1999.
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Table 8: Wealth Distribution [Complete Annuity]
Statistics for Wealth Distribution Annuity I Baseline I ~
Gini for the whole population 0.8274 1 0.7810
Proportion of pop. without wealth 23.98% 1 20.71%
Share of wealth held by top 1% 33.80% 1 24.17%
Top 5% 59.68% I 49.78%
Top 10% 71.95% I 64.34%
Top 20% 84.94% I 80.22%
Top 40% 95.96% 94.47% ~~
Top 60% 99.53% I 99.2%
Mean/Median 6.29 1 4.13
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 2894 1 1207
Gini for working population 0.8412 1 0.7992
Proportion of working pop. w/o wealth 28.41% 1 24.83%
Gini for retired population 0.7861 1 0.7383
Proportion of retired pop. w/o wealth 13.82% 1 11.3%
Gini for college graduates 0.7777 1 0.7356
Gini for non-college graduates 0.8024 0.7411 -
Table 9: Bequests Distribution [Complete Annuity]
Statistics for Bequests Distribution  Annuity Baseline 11
Gini 1 0.8616 1 0.8289
Proportion of population without bequests 1 36.93% 1 37.11%
education group all increase dramatically. The hikes are caused by the concentration of wealth in rich 
households, as can been seen from the massive increases in the share of wealth held by top 1% of the 
distribution and the ratio of wealth held by top 1% to that held by bottom 40% of the distribution. 
In contrast, the proportions of people without wealth for the whole population and for each age group 
increase more modestly. 
                Table 10: Consumption Distribution [Complete Annuity]
Statistics for Consumption. Distr. Annuity I Baseline 1I
Gini 0.4178 1 0.4003 11
Variance of log consumption 0.4918 1 0.4643 11
Gini for working population 0.4146 1 0.3989
Gini for retired population 0.4264 1 0.3994
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eTable 11: Aggregate Varia bles and Prices [Complete Annuity]
Statistics for Aggregates Annuity Baseline
Capital relative to Baseline 0.921 1.00
Bequests relative to Baseline 0.675 1.00
Soc. Sec./GDP 9.33% 9.34%
Gov. Rev./GDP 28.21% 27.82%
Bequests/Capital 0.0683 0.0932
Prices 11
Yearly interest rate 5.45% 4.95%
                       ~~After-tax yearly interest rate 3.28% 1 2.98% ~~ 
  Figure 5 shows the age-wealth profiles for people who are in the top 20%, middle 40%, and bottom 
40% of the earnings ability (0) distribution. The profiles before retirement (age 7) have similar shapes 
to those of the baseline conomy, although wealth accumulated before retirement isslightly lower than 
in the baseline conomy. A notable difference is observed for the profiles after retirement, now they 
dissipate their assets more slowly and therefore hold more assets until their death. In the baseline 
economy, where there is no insurance for uncertain lifetime, people tend to spend their income for 
consumption while their death probabilities are relatively small, because they face the risk of leaving 
wealth not intended for their children at death. Now that they are insured against such events, they 
can smooth consumption after retirement. The fraction of assets annuitized is almost close to 1 for 
those in the bottom 60% of the distribution of earnings ability (when they have positive wealth), and 
is much lower (about 0.74) for those in the top 10% of the distribution. As a result, the Gini coefficient 
of the bequests distribution is much higher than in the baseline conomy (Table 9). This would be 
the main reason of the higher concentration ofwealth in the rich population observed in Table 8. 
  As a result of higher wealth inequality, consumption i equality also becomes higher than in the 
baseline conomy (see Table 10). The age-consumption profiles (Figure 6) show clearly the effect 
of complete annuity markets on consumption smoothing after retirement. The effect is particularly 
strong for consumption behaviors of the rich people. 
  Finally, Table 11 presents aggregate variables and prices. The equilibrium yearly before-tax interest 
rate increases to 5.45% from 4.95% of the baseline conomy, which corresponds toa 7.9% decrease in
aggregate capital. The lack of accidental bequests i  causing this drop. Aggregate bequests how a 
much bigger 3,2.5% decline, and as a result, the ratio of bequests to total capital drops from 0.0932 to
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0.0683. 
6.3 No Earnings Shock 
       Table 12: Earnings Distribution [No Earnings Uncertainty]
Statistics for Earnings Distribution No Earnings Shock Baseline
Gini coefficient 0.5629 0.6319
Share of earnings held by top 1% 6.84% 10.26%
Top 5% 23.72% 29.19%
Top 10% 37.35% 43.34%
Top 20% 55.25% 63.2%
Top 40% 80.91% 85.38% i
Top 60% 95.08% 97.19%
Ratio of highest 1% to lowest 40% 55.63 146.1
Mean/Median 1.335 1.768
Gini for log-lifetime earnings 0.3341 0.3996 i
Gini for college graduates 0.5085 0.5934 i
Gini for non-college graduates 0.4821 0.5763 i
Earnings ratio of college to non-college 2.715 2.713
Table 13: Wealth Distribution [No EarningsUncertainty]
Statistics for Wealth Distribution No Earnings Shock Baseline
Gini for the whole population 0.7471 0.7810 i
Proportion of pop. without wealth 26.57% 20.71%
Share of wealth held by top 1% 24.9% 24.17% i
Top 5% 45.63% 49.78% i
Top 10% 59.43% 64.34% i
Top 20% 75.54% 80.22% i
Top 40% 92.34% 94.47% i
Top 60% 99.06% 99.2% i
Mean/Median 2.746 4.134 i
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 1065 1207 i
Gini for working population 0.788 0.7992 i
Proportion of working pop. w/o wealth 37.55% 24.83% i
Gini for retired population 0.6508 0.7383 i
Proportion of retired pop. w/o wealth 1.44% 11.3% i
Gini for college graduates 0.7007 0.7356 i
Gini for non-college graduates 0.7032 0.7411
  In this experiment, earnings uncertainty is removed by assigning the same value of the earnings 
shock 77 to all the individuals. The constant value of q is set so that aggregate fficiency labor of 
this economy is at the same level as in the baseline economy. This economy can be considered to 
approximate a hypothetical economy where there exists complete insurance for earnings uncertainty. 
  As Table 12 shows, the earnings inequality decreases dramatically in this economy in almost all
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the dimensions, in particular a drop of the Gini for log-lifetime earnings is worth mentioning. The 
exception is the earnings ratio of college graduates to the rest of the population, which is expected 
because the distribution of the earnings ability B is kept constant. 
  This large decrease in earnings inequality also greatly diminishes wealth inequality, as can be 
seen in Table 13. However, the effect on the working population and on the retired population are 
different. The Gini for the working population decreases only slightly and the proportion of households 
in this group without wealth increases greatly, while both the Gini and the proportion of non-wealth 
households for the retired population decreases dramatically. Removal of earnings uncertainty implies 
lower lifetime earnings inequality and smaller precautionary savings among the young, each of which 
affects the wealth distribution of this sub population in the opposite directions. In contrast, for 
retirees both the equalized lifetime earnings distribution and the resulting more equal social security 
benefits contribute to lower wealth inequality. Since wealth is held mostly by retirees but non-wealth 
households are mostly young, the overall Gini rises and the proportion of the whole population without 
wealth falls. The effect on the bequests distribution is similar to that on the wealth distribution of 
retirees as shown in Table 14. 
                Table 14: Bequests Distribution [No Earnings Uncertainty]
Statistics for Bequests Distribution I No Earnings Shock I Baseline 11
Gini I 0.7776 1 0.8289 11
Proportion of population w/o bequests 1 26.06% 1 37.11% 11
  The age-wealth profiles (Figure 7) exhibit much lower wealth accumulation before middle ages, 
driven by the much lower precautionary savings. After around age 4 (age 45-49 in real life), other 
savings motives eem to dominate and the profiles look very similar to the baseline conomy. 
              Table 15: Consumption Distribution [No Earnings Uncertainty]
Statistics for Consumption Distr. I No Earnings Shock I Baseline
Gini 0.3534 0.4003
Variance of log consumption 0.3392 0.4643 i
Gini for working population 0.3499 0.3989 i
Gini for retired population 0.3599 0.3994
  Consumption i equality decreases greatly too (Table 15), reflecting the lower inequalities oflifetime 
earnings and bequests. The shapes of the age-consumption profiles (Figure 8) show a noticeable
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Table 16: Aggregate Variables and Prices [No Earnings Uncertainty]
Statistics for Aggregates I No Earnings Shock I Baseline
Capital relative to Baseline 1 0.933 1 1.00
Bequests relative to Baseline 1 1.00 1 1.00
Soc. Sec./GDP 1 8.65% 1 9.34%
Gov. Rev./GDP 28.16% 1 27.82% 11
Bequests/Capital 0.1004 1 0.0932 11
11 Prices
Yearly interest rate 5.41% 4.95%
After-tax yearly interest rate 3.26% 2.98%
difference in consumption behaviors after age 3, in particular for the rich. In the baseline conomy, 
after the peaks around age 4 or 5, consumption steadily decreases with age. In contrast, in this 
economy, consumption is almost constant between age 3 and 7 and after age 8 it decreases more 
rapidly. Due to the disappearance of earnings fluctuations, they can smooth consumption during a 
working period to a larger degree. 
  Aggregate variables and prices are shown in Table 16. The yearly before-tax interest rate increases 
to 5.41%, which implies that aggregate capital decreases by 6.7% in comparison to the baseline 
economy. The effect of fully insuring earnings uncertainty on aggregate capital accumulation is a 
little weaker than the effect of fully insuring lifetime uncertainty. The differences of the effects are 
more striking in bequests, now aggregate bequests are almost he same as in the baseline conomy. 
While the lack of earnings uncertainty reduces precautionary savings greatly, the resulting decrease 
in inequality of lifetime earnings makes it for more people to leave bequests. These two effects on 
aggregate bequests eem to cancel out each other. 
6.4 No Altruism 
Finally, the effect of altruism on savings and consumption decisions are investigated by simulating the 
hypothetical economy where people do not obtain utility from leaving bequests. This case differs from 
the baseline conomy only in the absence of the utility from bequests, F(b'). Accidental bequests are 
transferred to heirs as before. 
  Table 17 shows the statistics for the wealth distribution of this economy in comparison to those for 
the baseline conomy. Inequality declines in all the dimensions. In particular, concentration ofwealth
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Table 17: Wealth Distribution [No Altruism]
 Statistics for Wealth Distribution No Altruism Baseline I
Gini for the whole population 0.7282 0.781 i
Proportion of pop. without wealth 19.79% 20.71% i
Share of wealth held by top 1% 14.39% 24.17% i
Top 5% 38.47% 49.78% i
Top 10% 55.01% 64.34%
Top 20% 74.51% 80.22%
Top 40% 92.66% 94.47% i
Top 60% 98.86% 99.2% i
Mean/Median 3.319 4.134 i
Highest 1%/Lowest 40% 505.2 1207 i
Gini for working population 0.7608 0.7992 i
Proportion of working pop. w/o wealth 24.16% 24.83% i
Gini for retired population 0.6525 0.7383 i
Proportion of retired pop. w/o wealth 9.81% 11.3% i
Gini for college graduates 0.6703 0.7356 i
Gini for non-college graduates 0.6973 0.7411 i
Table 18: Bequests Distribution [No Altruism]
11Statistics for Bequests Distribution No Altruism Baseline 11
Gini 0.7484 0.8289 11
Proportion of population without bequests 34.55% 37.11% 11
in the far right tail of the distribution and the inequality of wealth among the retired population 
decrease greatly, reflecting the disappearance of altruism. In contrast, improvement of the wealth 
distribution among the working population is more modest. 
  Figure 9 presents the age-wealth profiles for people who are in the top 20%, middle 40%, and 
bottom 40% of the earnings ability (0) distribution. For those with a lower earnings ability, the shape 
of the profile is very similar to the profile for the baseline conomy. But for those with a high earnings 
ability, large differences are observed. First, the amount of assets accumulated at the peak (age 7) 
is much lower than that of the baseline conomy. Further, they deplete their wealth holdings much 
more rapidly after the peak, and at age 11 the differences in wealth holdings among different skill 
groups become very small. In this economy, people are concerned only about their own consumption. 
While death probabilities are small, they keep large wealth for future consumption, but as the death 
probabilities increase with age, they decrease their assets holdings rapidly. This is the reason why the 
profile is much steeper for rich people after retirement, and wealth is much less concentrated in the 
rich.
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Table 19: Consumption Distribution [No Altruism]
No Altruism Baseline iStatistics for Consumption Distr.
Gini 0.3938 0.4003
Variance of log consumption 0.4631 0.4643 i
Gini for working population 0.3951 0.3989 i
Gini for retired population 0.388 0.3994 i
Table 20: Aggregate Variables and Prices [No Altruism]
Statistics for Aggregates No Altruism Baseline I
Capital relative to Baseline 0.796 1.00
Bequests relative to Baseline 0.667 1.00
Soc. Sec./GDP 9.35% 9.34%
Gov. Rev./GDP 29.0% 27.82%
Bequests/Capital 0.0781 0.0932 I
Prices
Yearly interest rate 6.48% 4.95%
After-tax yearly interest rate 3.90% 2.98%
  Figure 10 shows the age-bequests receipts profiles for young adults. Now all the bequests are 
accidental as opposed to those altruistically motivated. The biggest difference from the baseline 
economy is the huge drop in the amount of bequests received after age 3. At age.6 nobody receives 
any bequests. As they get older, death probabilities of their parents become higher, and as a result, the 
parents reduce their assets holdings. When the parents are at age 11, they know that they are going 
to die for certain, so they do not leave any bequests. Table 18 shows the distribution of bequests. The 
Gini coefficient is much lower smaller the baseline economy and the proportion of population without 
leaving bequests is a little lower. 
  The lower wealth inequality also results in lower consumption inequality, as observed in Table 19, 
but the decrease is very small, especially for the working population and for the whole population. 
More equal bequests receipts tend to equalize the consumption distribution among the young, while 
the disappearance of altruism allows richer people to consumer more, and the result suggests that the 
two effects nearly cancel out each other. Figure 11 shows that the age-consumption profile for people 
with a high-earnings ability is much steeper after retirement compared to the baseline economy, which 
corresponds tothe rapid dissipation of wealth holdings een in the age-wealth profile (Figure 9). 
  Finally, Table 20 presents aggregate variables and prices. The equilibrium yearly before-tax interest 
rate increases to 6.48% from 4.95%, associated with a 20.4% decrease in aggregate capital. The
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disappearance of altruism in this economy also results in a 33.3% decrease in aggregate bequests. 
6.5 Robustness 
The above results have been based on the calibration where the correlation coefficient of the AR(1) 
process for the earnings hock, C, is set 0.4 and the coefficient of relative risk aversion a is 4.0. 
Although this calibration has produced good matches of the model economy to the U.S. economy, 
there are no U.S. statistics that directly pin down the values of these two parameters. Since they 
are crucial in determining the relative strength of the precautionary motive of savings, this section 
checks robustness of the results by choosing different values for the two parameters and recalibrating 
the model accordingly. 
6.5.1 Comparisons of baseline economies under different parameterization 
                       Table 21: Calibrated Bequest Parameters

























Table 22: Earnings Distribution when ( = 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5
Statistics for Earnings Distribution C=0.3 1 C=0.4 1 (=0.5
cEE 0.4079 0.392 0.3704
Gini of lifetime earnings 0.3943 0.3996 0.4058
5 year correlation of log earnings 0.682 0.7203 0.7581 11
Intergenerational correlation of log-lifetime earnings 0.4623 0.4484 0.4322 11
  The procedure of the recalibration is as follows. For the parameter C,three different values 0.3, 0.4, 
and 0.5 are tried. For a given value of C, the variance ofthe disturbance t rm to the earnings shock 
process, a., is adjusted so that the cross-sectional distribution ofearnings remains unchanged. Asfor 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion a, the values 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0 are tried. For a given value of 
a, the parameters of the bequest function bl and b2 are adjusted so that the baseline model under 
the new parameterization yields the same Gini coefficient for the wealth distribution of the whole
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Table 23: Wealth, Bequests, and Consumption Distributions for different values of ( when o = 4.0
d Statistics 5=0.3 1 C=0.4 1 5=0.5
Share of wealth held by top 1% 24.32% 24.17% 22.85%
Wealth ratio of top 1% to bottom 40% 1092.4 1206.9 1613.8
Wealth Gini for working population 0.7985 0.7992 0.8015
Proportion of working pop. w/o wealth 23.29% 24.83% 26.89%
Wealth Gini for retired population 0.7395 0.7383 0.7339
Proportion of retired pop. w/o wealth 10.32% 11.3% 13.59%
Bequests Gini 0.8303 0.8289 0.8211
Consumption Gini 0.3934 0.4003 0.4047
Bequests/Capital 0.0962 0.0932 0.0907
Table 24: Wealth, Bequests, and Consumption Distributions for different values of a when (= 0.4
11 Statistics a=3.0 1 c = 4.0 1 a=5.0 11
49.78% ] 50.66% 11Share of wealth held by top 5% 48.39%
Wealth ratio of top 1% to bottom 40% 1755.51 1206.9 ' 893.4 11
Wealth Gini for working population 0.8033 1 0.7992 1 0.796
Proportion of working pop. w/o wealth 30.02% 1 24.83% 1 23.76%
Wealth Gini for retired population 0.7301 1 0.7383 1 0.7458
Proportion of retired pop. w/o wealth 12.48% 1 11.3% 1 9.97%
iBequests Gini 0.8246 1 0.8289 1 0.8307Consumption Gini 0.4079 1 0.4003 1 0.3882
Bequests/Capital 0.0884 1 0.0932 1 0.0965
population. Note that this does not mean that other dimensions of the wealth distribution remain 
unchanged with the new parameters. Table 21 shows the chosen values of the bequest parameters for 
9 combinations ofC and a, including the original parameterization, (= 0.4 and a = 4.0. 
  Table 22 presents selected statistics of the earnings distributions when the correlation coefficient of
the earnings shock process, C, is set 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5. Since the unconditional distribution of the earnings 
shock is kept constant, the distributions of earnings for the whole population and for each skill group 
do not change. In contrast, the distribution of lifetime arnings becomes more unequal with larger(, 
since the earnings hock at age 0 is drawn from the same unconditional distribution but it becomes 
more crucial in determining the shocks at later ages. Obviously the period-by-period correlation of log 
earnings increases and the intergenerational correlation of log lifetime arnings decrease with larger C. 
  Selected statistics of the distributions of wealth, bequests, and consumption for different values of 
 when a = 4.0 are summarized in Table 23. Similar qualitative results are found for a = 3.0 and 
5.0 as well. Other things being equal, higher persistence of the earnings hocks (larger () increases 








to higher wealth. inequality among them24. As seen in the previous section, savings for bequests axe 
not important in determining their saving behaviors, so the distribution of wealth of the working 
population becomes more unequal with larger (. Thus, in order to keep the Gini for the whole 
population constant, wealth inequality among the retirees must be decreased slightly. This is achieved 
by weakening altruistically motivated savings through lowering bequest parameters bl and b2 when 
is higher. Higher inequality in lifetime earnings also raises consumption inequality slightly. Because 
of the lower values of the bequest parameters, the ratio of aggregate bequests to aggregate capital 
declines. 
  Table 24 shows selected statistics of the distributions of wealth, bequests, and consumption for 
different values of a when ( is set 0.4. Qualitative results remain unchanged when C = 0.3 and 
0.5. Other things being equal, the higher value for the coefficient of relative risk aversion increases 
precautionary savings and total capital accumulation and reduces wealth inequality among the working 
population. In order to keep the Gini for the whole population constant across different calibrations, 
therefore, wealth inequality among the retired population needs to be raised slightly. Note that higher 
a also implies a lower rate of intertemporal substitution, thus a flatter age-consumption profile. Since 
consumption is at peak before retirement, savings for consumption after retirement increase, which 
contributes to higher wealth inequality among the retired population25 and larger wealth accumulation. 
As a result of this larger wealth accumulation, the interest rate declines. and the relative return from 
leaving bequests goes up for given bequests parameters, which raises altruistically motivated savings 
and wealth inequality among the retirees even more. It turns out that, in order to match the Gini 
for the whole population, bequest parameters must be smaller when a is higher. Because-of stronger 
precautionary motives, proportions of the population without wealth decrease. The ratio of bequests 
to capital increases due to higher life-cycle savings.
 24Precautionary savings are relatively more important among the poor
, who leave little bequests and receive social 
security benefits more than proportional to earnings. 
 25 This is due to the presence of progressive social security system.
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6.5.2 Robustness of results on distributions 
Changes in the distributions of wealth, bequests, and consumption, and aggregate variables in the three 
hypothetical economies in comparison tothe baseline conomy are qualitatively the same in almost all 
the dimensions under all the parameterization. Quantitatively, as detailed below, differences in rates 
of the changes are observed. 
  Economy with complete annuity markets: In all the nine cases, almost all the measures of inequal-
ities worsen and aggregate capital and bequests decrease in this economy compared to the baseline 
economy. When the coefficient of relative risk aversion a is larger, rates of increases in wealth in-
equality and of a decrease in capital become smaller, while the rate of a decrease in bequests becomes 
larger. On the other hand, raising the correlation coefficient ofthe earnings shock process ( has mostly 
ambiguous effects on the rates of changes of distribution measures, but it does increase the rates of 
the decreases of bequests and capital accumulation. When the coefficient is higher, the calibrated 
bequests parameters are smaller and altruism is relatively weaker (the ratio of bequests to capital is 
smaller), hence the change is larger. 
  Economy without earnings uncertainty: In the economy without earnings uncertainty, the pro-
portion of households without wealth goes up except for the retired population, and all the other 
measures ofwealth inequality, consumption i equality, and aggregate capital accumulation fall for all 
the parameter values. In contrast, the effect on aggregate bequests i ambiguous. Higher a implies 
smaller ates of decreases of the inequality measures except proportions of households without wealth. 
The rates of increases of the proportions and decreases of aggregate capital, in turn, increase with 
larger a. Increasing ( raises rates of decreases of inequality measures aside from proportions of people 
without wealth (except for the retired population), whose rates of increases fall. The effect on rates 
of changes on capital and bequests are ambiguous. 
  Economy without altruism: In all the cases, wealth and bequests inequalities and aggregate capital 
and bequests decline in contrast to the baseline economy. In contrast, the effect on consumption 
inequality is ambiguous, declining when a = 3.0 and 4.0 but rising when a = 5.0, and rates of the 
changes are very small. Rates of decreases of wealth and bequests inequalities and of the aggregate 
variables are larger when the coefficient of relative risk aversion a is higher, except for proportions
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Table 25: Capital and Bequests [Complete Annuity]





























Table 26: Capital and Bequests [No Earnings Shock]



























of households without wealth or bequests. Rate of their declines are greater when the correlation 
coefficient of the earnings hock process (is smaller. 
6.5.3 Robustness of results on aggregate capital and bequests accumulation 
Finally, robustness i checked with respect o rates of changes in aggregate capital and bequests of 
the three hypothetical economies in comparison tothe baseline conomy. Table 25 presents aggregate 
capital and bequests in the economy with complete annuity markets in all the nine cases. As before, 
the values are normalized so that capital and bequests in the baseline conomy is equal to 1 for each 
parameterization. I  all the cases, both capital and bequests decrease with the latter decreasing more. 
The decreases are greater when the correlation coefficient of the earnings hock process ( is larger. 
As for the coefficient of relative risk aversion a, the decrease in capital is greater and the decrease 
in bequests i  smaller when the coefficient is higher, except for one case. The rate of capital decline 
ranges from 1.0%, when = 3.0 and (= 0.3, to 12.2%, when a = 5.0 and (= 0.5, while the rate of 
bequests decline ranges from 25.7%, when a = 5.0, and (= 0.3 to 42.3%, when a = 3.0 and (= 0.5. 
  Table 26 shows capital and bequests in the economy without earnings uncertainty. Aggregate 
capital decline in all the cases, while bequests decrease in six cases and increase in three cases. Capital 
decreases more and bequests are more likely to decline when a is greater except for one case. As for (,
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Table 27: Capital and Bequests [No Altruism]

























there are no such clear-cut tendency. The rate of capital decline ranges from 3.8%, when a = 3.0 and 
 = 0.5, to 10.4%, when a = 5.0 and (= 0.5, while the rate of bequests decline ranges from -1.7%, 
when a = 4.0 and (=0.3, to 2.5%, when a= 5.0 and (=0.5. 
  Lastly Table 27 presents capital and bequests in the economy without altruism. Under every 
parameterization both capital and bequests decline greatly, and the declines are larger when a is 
larger and (is smaller. The rate of capital decline ranges from 9.9%, when a = 3.0 and ( = 0.5, to 
30.0%, when a = 5.0 and (= 0.3, while the rate of bequests decline ranges from 18.5%, when a = 3.0 
and(=0.5,to45.1%, when a=5.0and(=0.3. 
  Comparisons of the three hypothetical economies show that capital decline is always largest in the 
economy without altruism and bequests decline is always mallest in the economy without earnings 
uncertainty. Other rankings depend on parameter values, but in 6 out of the 9 cases, capital decline 
is larger in the economy with complete annuity markets than.in the economy without earnings uncer-
tainty, and again in 6 out of the 9 cases, bequests decline is larger in the economy without altruism 
than in the economy with complete annuity markets. Differences in rates of changes of aggregate 
capital among the three economies are smallest when a = 3.0 and (= 0.5 and largest when a = 5.0 
and ( = 0.3, while differences in rates of changes of bequests are smallest when a = 3.0 and (= 0.3 
and largest when or = 5.0 and (= 0.3 or when a = 3.0 and (= 0.5. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper has investigated quantitative importance ofdifferent savings motives on wealth distribution 
and aggregate capital accumulation by solving an overlapping generations model with heterogeneity 




baseline economy there are uninsurable idiosyncratic risks associated with uncertain lifetime and 
earnings shocks. The model's parameter values have been chosen so that the simulated earnings and 
wealth distributions of the baseline economy match those observed in the U.S. data. 
   We have compared the allocations of the baseline economy with those of an economy with com-
plete annuity markets, an economy without earnings uncertainty, and an economy without altruism. 
The numerical experiments have shown that different savings motives seem to affect savings behav-
iors of various parts of the population in an unequal manner, so their effects on wealth distribution 
and capital accumulation are distinctive. The effect of completing annuity markets is dominantly on 
the old population and results in a large increase in wealth and bequests inequality through higher 
concentration of assets in the upper tail of the distribution. This is obtained because poor people try 
to annuitize most of their wealth if annuity securities are available. Alternatively, taking out earnings 
uncertainty decreases savings by the young population, especially among the poor, but lowers wealth 
inequality for the whole population because of the equalized lifetime earnings. Finally, the disappear-
ance of altruism affects mainly savings behavior of the old and rich population, reducing wealth and 
bequests inequality by lowering the concentration of wealth in the upper tail of the distribution. 
  The comparisons of aggregate capital and bequests in the three hypothetical economies with those 
in the baseline economy suggest that, aside from the pure life-cycle motive of savings, altruism is 
the most important factor affecting aggregate capital and bequests accumulation. Secondly in order 
of importance, especially in explaining aggregate bequests, is the absence of annuity markets that 
generate precautionary savings among the retired population and accidental bequests. The absence of 
insurance markets for earnings uncertainty, which generates precautionary savings among the working 
population, seems to be least important, in particular, in explaining bequests accumulation.
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8 Appendix : Computational Algorithms 
8.1 Algorithm to compute the steady-state distribution 
Step 1: Enter the j th iteration with a guess for the real interest rate r3 , and the wage rate w3. Also 
set the interval for assets to be [0, amax] 
  Step 2 (Solving the Dynamic Programming Problem): Solve the problem backwards start-
ing from the problem at age 11. 
     2-1 (Old Adult's Problem): Given the prices, solve the old adult's maximization problem (22) 
at age 11 and obtain the value function J11(l, a; S) and the corresponding decision rules. Given the 
value function at age 11, J11(l, a; S), solve the old adult's maximization problem (22) at age 10 and 
obtain the value function J10(l, a; S) and the corresponding decision rules. Continuing in this way,
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solve the maximization problems up to age 7. The solution of the problem at age 7 gives the value 
function J7(l, a; S) and the associated ecision rules. 
     2-2 (Problem at age 6): 
   a) (When the parent died before the previous period): Given the value function at age 7, J7(l, a; S), 
solve the maximization problem (20) and obtain the value function W6(9,17,1, a; S) and the associated 
decision rules. 
  b) (When the parent has just died): Given the value function, solve the maximization problem 
(21) and obtain the value function V6(6, (0,,q,1, a  sP; S) and the decision rules. 
     2-3 (Young Adult's Problem): 
  a) (When the parent died before the previous period): Given Wi+1(6, r1,1, a; S) (1 < j < 5), solve 
the problem (19) and obtain Wi (0,,q,1, a; S) and the corresponding decision rules. 
  b) (When the parent has just died): Given Wi+1(6, 77,1, a;S) (0 < j < 5), solve the problem (17) 
and obtain Vi (0,,q,1, a, sP; S) and the decision rules. 
   c) (When the parent is alive): Given 0+1(6, (0,,q,1, a  sP; S) (0 < j < 5) and Vi+1(6, q, 7, a, SP; S) 
(0 < j < 4), solve the problem (9) and obtain Vi (0,,q,1, a, sP; S) and the decision rules. 
  Step 3 (Monte Carlo Simulation): Pick an initial child-parent pair, who are at age 0 and age 
6, respectively. Starting from this pair, perform a Monte Carlo simulation for one lineage based on 
the decision rules computed above. Continue the simulation for large enough numbers of generations. 
Based on the simulation, obtain the distribution of assets and efficiency labor. Since the model has 
an ergodic property, the computed istribution remains the same if the simulation is performed for 
many different lineages. See the next subsection for detailed procedures. 
  Step 4 (Adjustment of the interval of assets): Check if the distribution of assets does not 
have a large mass at the maximum level of assets, am,,. If it has, increase the value of amax and 
resolve the maximization problems and redo the Monte Carlo simulation (Go back to Step 2). 
  Step 5 (Update of the prices and the convergence check ): Based on the distributions of 
the state variables, compute aggregate capital ki and efficiency labor h. Substituting these values 
into the firm's first-order conditions, obtain the implied real interest rate r3 and wage rate wj. Stop 
if the price differences from the last iteration are small enough. If not, go back to Step 1 with new
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guesses forthe prices. For the updated prices, the weighted averages of the currently used prices and 
the newly computed prices might be used. 
8.2 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Step 1 (Initial states of the initial child-parent pair): Start he simulation with the initial child-
parent pair, whose ages are age 0 and age 6, respectively. Their initial states must be determined. 
   Assume that he parent of the age 6 adult's parent isdead before .the previous period. Then the 
age 6 adult's state variables are the only information needed to solve his maximization problem (20). 
His initial assets level a6 land average labor productivity l61are set arbitrary26, and the variables 9_1 
and,q61 are drawn randomly from the underlying (unconditional) distributions . Based on the initial 
state variables, the decision rules for his current consumption and assets holdings in the next period 
a7 1, and the transition rules for his tate variables aredetermined. 
  The state variables of the young adult are the ones needed to solve the problem (9). His initial 
asset level ao is set o be zero, the variables 0o and qo are drawn randomly from the underlying 
(unconditional) distributions, a d the average labor productivity to s set o be eo,qo0(0) . Since he is 
assumed to make decisions after observing his parent's decisions, his remaining state variables (the 
parental state) are the age of his parent (= 6), 7% and a? 1. The parental state isneeded to predict 
possible bequests receipt. Based on the initial state variables, the decision rules for his consumption 
and assets ao, and the transition rules for the states are determined. 
  Step 2 (Determination f the initial old adult's living status): Since the old adult faces a
positive death probability, hisliving status for the next period must be determined. His living status 
is determined based on the survival probability. If he dies when turning age 7, the amount ofbequests 
left to the young adult is equal to a? 1. 
  Step 3 (Initial young adult before age 6): One period has passed. If the old adult is still 
alive, he solves the same maximization problem as in the previous period. Given his current s ates 
i 1 and a? 1, the decision rules and the transition rules for his states are determined. 
   If the old parent is still alive, the young adult solves the same problem as in the previous period. 
  26The subscript is an index for generation and the superscript is an index for age. The generation who is at age 0 in 
the initial period is denoted generation 0, and the generation of age 6 (his parent) is denoted generation -1.
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If not, he receives bequests equal to a7 l and solves the problem (17). The value of vo is drawn 
randomly from the underlying unconditional distribution, which together with the stochastic process 
(13) determines 711.His new average labor productivity to s determined based on (12). The other 
state variables are determined as in the previous period. Based on his states, the decision rules and 
the transition rules for the states are determined. A similar process is continued until the young adult 
becomes age 6. 
   Step 4 (Initial young adult after age 6 and his child): Now the young adult is at age 6. 
At this age, he has his child (age 0) and his parent isalready dead. He solves the problem (20) if his 
parent died before this period and solves the problem (21) if his parent has just died. His child's initial 
state variables must be set. The initial value for assets a2 is zero, the variable 172 is drawn randomly 
from the underlying unconditional distribution, and the initial ability 9 must be determined based on 
the parent's ability 010 and the stochastic process (7). The initial verage labor productivity s given 
by l2 = 9 g5(0)r72. The new age 0individual solves the problem (9). 
  .Step 5 (Remaining generations): Step 3 and Step 4 are repeated for a large enough number of 
generations, say 150,000 generations. The state variables of the first 15,000 generations are discarded 
in order to remove ffects of initial conditions, and using the variables for the remaining enerations, 
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